War without garlands ebook

The attack on the citadel of Brest-Litovsk by elements of the 45rd Division is vividly written is this book. The Germans lost in the first 24 hours many men, almost two-thirds of the entire lost during the preceding six-week French campaign. The German soldier was not only surprised by the great quantity of the Russian forces, but also by its tenacity.

Few Russians surrendered and most fought until the last man had fallen. The citadel of Brest-Litovsk, expected to fall within 8 hours after the invasion, only fell after a siege of 42 days. The Russian tanks were also an unpleasant surprise. A single KV-1 tank was able to block the advance of the 6th Panzer Division for 48 hours.

The German tank crews were clearly shocked by the appearance of heavier and obviously superior Russian tanks. The Russian tanks presented a wholly new level of armament, armor protection and weight. Only their battle experience, superior tactics and the fact that the Russian air force was nowhere to be seen, helped the Panzers in winning their tank battles. The German army was making headway, but at some cost.

Following along the lines of the classical Blitzkrieg doctrine, large concentrations of Russian troops were encircled by the Panzers and finished of by infantry.

The experience in Poland and the West was that Blitzkrieg tactics achieved operational success once armies hat been outmaneuvered. Denied space and resources, the political will collapsed when faced with pointless casualties. However, the Russian soldier fought on in hopeless conditions. In the beginning of July Army Group Centre had created two encirclements, one at Minsk and a larger one at Smolensk. The destruction of the Smolensk pocket would mean that a large part of the western group of Soviet Armies would be destroyed and securing the road for the eventual advance on Moscow.

The slowly advancing German infantry soldiers were marching forward under relentless heat. However, the gap between the advancing Panzers and the slowly advancing infantry meant that insufficient troops were available to 'finish of' the pockets.

Despite staggering Soviet losses, the Blitzkrieg momentum had run out of steam just beyond Smolensk. Without the infantry available to defend the Panzers, the Panzers themselves were required to fight defensive battles against the Russians, who continued fighting against all odds. The Panzers divisions were sustaining punishment far beyond that meted out by any foe thus far in the war. So far, by the 8th of July, the German general staff had calculated that it had destroyed 89 of identified Russian divisions.

But there were no further German formations of appreciable operational size available to continue the drive eastward until the Smolensk pocket was annihilated.

Breathtaking the victories were, at the end of July the German army concluded that the vast battles it had fought meant that the Pyrrhic nature of this achievement was becoming apparent. Hitler's decision to start a new offensive in the south meant that most of the Panzers were transferred to the South, leaving Army Group Centre to play a marginal role. Meanwhile, the German soldier was growing more and more desperate. The vast space, the long marches, the heavy losses due to the stubborn Russian resistance meant that by now, most German soldiers were convinced that the campaign would not end shortly.

Atrocities on both sides were commonplace. National Socialist propaganda had 'dehumanised' the enemy before the campaign had begun. The infamous commissar order meant that every captured commissar was separated from soldiers and executed. Maltreatment and shooting of Rusian PoWs was widespread. The logistic 'trip-wire' was the limit of the Ostheer's strategic logistical sustainability beyond which an offensive aimed at Moscow could not be achieved unless supported with a rail-based transport network.

The lorry fleet, already decimated by the eve of operation Typhoon, was barely able to keep up with the fighting formations, but deliveries to the German troops were always too low. However, at the beginning of the campaign, no preparations were made to adjust the Russian railways to the standard European gauge. Once adjusted, the Russian railway tracks proved not fit for the heavier German locomotives and Russian coal could not burn effectively in the German steam engines.

The Germans simply thought that the war would be won within km from the starting point of the invasion. The attack aimed again at an encirclement, with the closing east of Vyazma, km from Moscow. The offensive would begin with its main Panzers at half its strength, shortages in fuel, ammunition and spare parts. However, the average German soldier was full of confidence - this would be the final battle resulting in victory. Once more, vast number of Russian troops were encircled and destroyed.

Nothing now lay anymore between the victorious German army and the fall of Moscow. General Georgi Zhukov was recalled from Leningrad and ordered to report to the capital. On October 8th, the first snow fell. The roads were covered in mud and the German soldier was becoming more and more concerned.

Movement for the Panzers was impossible. It was not until November 12th that the Panzers were able to move again. By that time the ground had frozen and the roads could be traveled again. Winter had come. The final phase of Operation Typhoon was launched on the 16th of November. Snow and ice conditions changed the nature of fighting on the Eastern Front.

Both sides were subjected to the same conditions but the Ostheer was disadvantaged by the unfamiliar environment. They were neither trained, equipped nor psychological prepared for winter operations. These were degraded to man-to-man frontal attacks, because flanking operations were denied by the harsh conditions.

German casualties were high, especially felt at NCO level. The Luftwaffe support began to fall away because bad weather and the effects of the resupply crisis. The assumption was that, following a German victory, an occupation army of 56 divisions would remain in Russia for the winter. Not until mid-December did it become apparent that the mass of units would not only stay in Russia, but would actually engaged in active operations.

Economic production was unable to remedy the shortfall. An appeal was set in motion for the German civilian population to provide winter clothes and skis for the troops, only to become snarled up in sidings at Warsaw as greater importance was given to fuel and ammunition. Meanwhile, the railway logistic network ground to a frozen halt as a result of the weather and partisan attacks. The results were catastrophic. The Germans had to use white sheets from occupied Russian houses to camouflage themselves and started to chalk their helmets white.

During clear evenings the advancing infantry could see the flashes from Flak and the searchlight beams above the city of Moscow. The German effort had reached crisis point. Panzergruppe 3 at Krassnaya Polyana was within 20km of the suburbs. The Germans still were convinced that the Soviet forces were on the verge of collapse.

The contrary was the case. New armies from Ulan, Siberia and the border with Mongolia and China were being formed and assembled just behind the front. Russian intelligence was being informed that Japan was verging on an attack to the South, far away from Russian territory which freed Russian divisions from Siberia to be transferred to Moscow. In a frantic counter-offensive, the Germans were driven from the gates of Moscow.

The Ostheer had victored itself to death. View all 3 comments. Aug 26, Roger rated it it was ok Shelves: military-history , nazism. Given that this book's title is misleading, and that it is poorly edited running a manuscript through a spell checker is not editing!

This book is essentially the story of the German Army Group Centre's attack on Russia, from the 22 June to their withdrawal from Moscow in early - with a sideways glance at Army Group South's encirclement of the Russians around Kiev, and Army Group North's siege of Leningrad. Kershaw's style of storytelling - h Given that this book's title is misleading, and that it is poorly edited running a manuscript through a spell checker is not editing! Kershaw's style of storytelling - he's not the Ian Kershaw of the Hitler biographies - is to rely heavily on letters, diaries, SS reports and unit histories.

This is quite successful in that it gives the reader a sense of immediacy, and makes this large book pages a pageturner almost to the last. While most readers with an interest in World War II will know the history of Operation Barbarossa, Kershaw's book gives us the feeling of what it was like to be a German or Russian soldier caught up in the fighting. While the general history emphasises the enormous victories by the German army, what comes out through the quotes of letters and diaries in this book are the immediate enormous losses by the German Army Groups, even while they were scoring victory after victory.

Kershaw makes the point that this first year of Barbarossa indeed the first six months , wiped out the "old" core of officers and NCOs, who had fought through the earlier campaigns, and they were being replaced by cadres more steeped in National Socialist ideology.

This loss of the "moral" core of the Army is noted by Kershaw. War Without Garlands. This is a frank appraisal of a brutal and pitiless conflict. Other titles. Tour the Battlefield.

The D-Day Landings and Paris. D-Day Red Sabbath. This website uses cookies to improve your experience. We'll assume you're ok with this, but you can opt-out if you wish. Accept Read More. Close Privacy Overview This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website.

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These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may affect your browsing experience. As time wore on, however, the Eastern front became a byword for death for the Germans. In War Without Garlands , Robert Kershaw examines the campaign largely through the eyes of the German forces who were sent to fight and die for Hitler's grandiose plans. He draws on German war diaries, post-combat reports and secret SS files.

This original material, much of which has never before been published in English, sheds new light on operation 'Barbarossa', including the extent to which the German soldiers were genuinely surprised at the decision to attack Russia, given the well-publicised non-aggression pact. This seminal account will be required reading for all historians of World War II and all those interested in the course of the war. War Without Garlands.

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